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Thomas More and Lucian:
A Study in Satiric Influence and Technique*
* This essay is based upon a paper delivered at the West Virginia Association of
 
College English Teachers in October, 1971. Much of the research upon which this
 study is based was supported by a Claude Worthington Benedum Foundation Re
­search Grant during the summer of 1970.
1 For an explanation of the term “Menippean Satire” and the conventions 
of 
this genre, see Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (1957, rpt.; New
 York: Atheneum, 1966), Alvin B. Kernan, The Cankered Muse (New Haven: Yale
 University Press, 19'59), John M. Aden, “Toward a Uniform Satiric Terminology,”
 Satire Newsletter, 1 (1964), 30-32, and Juanita S. Williams, “Toward a Definition
 of Menippean Satire,” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University,
 1966).
by Warren W. Wooden
After Shakespeare’s Sonnets, Thomas More’s Utopia 
is
 perhaps the  
most controversial product of sixteenth century English literature.
 Near the center of the controversy over More’s methods, aims, and
 means in the Utopia lie the twin problems of the genre and literary
 heritage of his strange work. I suggest that the Utopia 
is
 modelled  
upon and may be most profitably studied in conjunction with the
 literature of classical satire. Specifically, I will first assemble the evi
­dence of More’s acquaintanceship with and admiration for the 2nd
 century a.d. Greek satirist, Lucian of Samosata. The central character
 in the Utopia, Raphael Hythloday, will then be considered as a sa
­tiric persona and other evidence of Lucianic techniques will be stud
­ied. Finally, the Utopia will be canvassed from the standpoint of
 classical Lucianic or Menippean satire—to adopt the modern term
 for satire of the Lucianic variety employed by Northroy Frye, Alvin
 Kernan and others—as evidence for a generic classification.1
More’s study of the works of Lucian of Samosata, the classical mas
­
ter of
 
prose satire, forms one of the most curiously neglected chapters  
of Utopia criticism. Despite More’s translations from the Greek sa
­tirist, his demonstrably 
close
 familiarity with the corpus of  his work,  
and the high praise for Lucian with which his correspondence is
 sprinkled, the great majority of More scholars studiously ignore the
 possibility of affinities between the satire of Lucian and that of the
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Utopia, a work admitted by all to be satirical in some degree.2 This
 
neglect is made more curious by the findings of the handful of schol
­ars who have investigated the techniques and targets of the Utopia
 in the light of a Lucianic model.3 Without exception these scholars
 conclude that there are striking
 
parallels and similarities between the  
characteristic methods of Lucian and those of More in the Utopia.
Traditionally these critics willing to acknowledge the possibility
 
of a positive, creative literary influence of Lucian upon More have
 focussed their studies either upon such minutia as that of borrowed
 nomenclature or, at the other extreme, broad theoretical similarities.
 
As
 a result, an attempt to assess the extent and importance of Lu ­
cianic satiric strategy in the Utopia itself has yet to be undertaken
 even in the best of these studies. It is my intention in this paper to
 suggest several of the larger satiric techniques employed by More
 which seem most, plausibly to derive from his study of Lucian. My
 purpose, then, is not to belabor real or imagined parallels between
 specific incidents in the Lucianic corpus and More’s Utopia, but
 rather to illustrate a similar philosophic outlook and satiric stance
 in the Greek and the Englishman including comment upon the cre
­ative and original uses to which More put those satiric tactics which
 so delighted him in his study of Lucian.
2
 
For example, note the dismissal of Lucian in the preface to the Yale Utopia'.  
“Lucian’s extravagant fantasy and robust humor find a possible echo only in a
 touch here or there....” (Utopia, ed. Edward Surtz and J. H. Hexter [New Haven:
 Yale University Press, 1’963] p. clxiii). This is the modern standard edition of the
 Utopia, and all subsequent citations of More’s text will refer to this edition.
3
 
H. W. Donner, An Introduction to Utopia, (London: Sidgewick and Jackson,  
Ltd., 1945), and C. S. Lewis, History of English Literature in the Sixteenth Cen
­tury, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), suggest a Lucianic model for the
 Utopia. C.R. Thompson, in The Translations of Lucian by Erasmus and St.
 Thomas More (Ithaca, N. Y.: Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., 1940) and also in “Lucian and
 Lucianism in the English Renaissance: An Introductory Study” (unpublished
 Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1937), has investigated the possibility in
 some detail and has concluded that the similarities between Lucian and the
 Utopia are too striking to be coincidental. In his illuminating article, “Satire in
 the Utopia,” PMLA, 78 (1963), 1-63-174, A. R. Heiserman detailed many generic
 similarities between Lucian’s satire and the Utopia. Most recently, T. S. Dorsch, in
 “Sir Thomas More and Lucian: An Interpretation Of Utopia,” Archiv fur das
 Studium der Neuren Sprachen und Literaturen, 20'3 (19'67), 345-363; an article
 which curiously does not mention the valuable work of either Thompson or
 Heiserman, concludes that More was heavily in Lucian’s debt in the composition
 of one of “the two most beautifully developed and most consistently sustained
 works of Lucianic irony in English literature” (p. 3-62). To this writer’s knowledge,
 no attempt has 
ever
 been made to rebut these critics’ contentions.
2
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Since the possibility of a positive Lucianic influence upon the
 
Utopia has been suggested, it seems apposite here to examine first
 that portion of the evidence for such a thesis which concerns More’s
 early study of Lucian. During 1505-1506, More and Erasmus initi
­ated an extended study of Lucian, each of them translating into Latin
 a number of the satiric dialogues of the Samosatan. In 1506, a vol
­ume containing the translations of Lucian by More and Erasmus was
 printed by Badius in Paris, containing eighteen short dialogues and
 ten longer ones by Erasmus and three dialogues and a declamation,
 Tyrannicida, translated by More.
The three Lucianic dialogues which, in addition to the Tyranni
­
cida, More chose to translate are the Cynicus, Menippus
 
(Necroman-  
tia), and Philopseudes. The choice is an interesting one, and accord
­ing to More’s dedicatory epistle, its basis was purely personal: they
 struck his fancy.4 A brief examination of the individual dialogues
 may aid in discovering what particular appeal these three satires
 held for More.
The Cynicus 
is
 a dialogue between a worldly young man and a  
Cynic philosopher, revolving about the reasons for the philosopher’s
 choice of a hard and austere life. The dialogue, essentially a satire
 upon luxurious living, concludes with the Cynic’s assertion that the
 simple life is the best, a conclusion which More, who wore a hair-
 shirt all of his adult life, would have heartily endorsed. Lucian’s con
­clusion in this dialogue, a faithful reproduction of the philosophical
 position taken by the original Cynics, is also essentially the classical
 philosophic basis of Menippean satire: the mean and sure estate.
 More’s endorsement of this philosophic position and his insistence
 upon its compatibility with the contemptu mundi tradition of Chris
­tianity are evinced in his dedicatory comments upon this dialogue.
 There More is explicit in stressing the common philosophic ground
 which he shared with the pagan satirist. More wrote that in this
 dialogue, “the severe life of the Cynics and their contented existence
 with few possessions is defended, the soft and enervating luxury of
4
 
“For just as all men do not love the same maiden, but one prefers and loves  
a certain one, nor can he easily tell precisely why, but 
she
 simply suits his taste, sb  
of the most agreeable dialogue of Lucian one man likes a certain one best, another
 prefers another; these ones have particularly struck my fancy, nor that merely by
 accident, I trust, nor they alone.” (From the dedicatory epistle to the translations
 of Lucian, trans. by C. R. Thompson in The Translations of Lucian by Erasmus
 and St. Thomas More, p. 25).
3
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voluptaries is denounced. In the same work the simplicity, temper
­
ance, and frugality of the Christian life, and finally that strait and
 narrow way that leads to life are commended."5
In the Menippus, Lucian’s target is the crowd of foolish philoso
­
phers, the philosophi gloriosi who bear the traditional brunt of the
 Menippean satirist’s scorn. Menippus goes about to the philosophers
 of the different sects hoping
 
to learn from them the correct manner in  
which to order his life. Each advises him to follow a different plan
 of life, all the while assuring Menippus that the philosopher’s own
 sect possesses exclusive knowledge of the truth. Disgusted by the con
­tradictions of the philosophers, Menippus journeys to the underworld
 to consult the seer Tiresias. The seer’s advice to Menippus is simple
 and to the point:
The life of the common sort is best, and you will act more wisely if you
 
stop speculating about heavenly bodies and discussing final causes and first
 causes, spit your scorn at those clever syllogisms, and counting all that sort
 of thing nonsense, make it always your sole object to put the present to good
 use and to hasten on your way, laughing a great deal and taking nothing
 seriously.6
The Menippus is notable as an exceptionally fine example of the
 
genre named for the Cynic philosopher-satirist. It contains most of
 the standard devices associated with the genre—the philosophus glo-
 riosus, the voyage, both dialogue and narrative elements, a simple
 philosophic norm—all of which may
 
be paralleled in the Utopia.
The third of the dialogues translated by More is the Philopseudes,
 which, while ostensibly a general satire on liars and the gullibility of
 their adherents, 
is
 primarily another indictment of foolish philoso ­
phers. The principal speaker, Tychiades, marvels at the credulity of
 men in putting their complete trust in all manner of outrageous pre
­varications. However his chief scorn is reserved for the philosophers,
 the lovers of wisdom, who should attempt to correct the errors of the
 common people. Instead, Tychiades finds that the philosophers are
5
 
C.R. Thompson, The Translations of Lucian, p. 25. Compare the Life of  
Pico, where More wrote that “the golden mediocrity, the mean estate, 
is
 to be de ­
sired which shall bear us as it were in hands more easily, which shall obey us and
 not master us.” (The English Works of Sir Thomas More, ed. W. E. Campbell [New
 York: Dial Press, 1931], I,
 
370).
6
 
Lucian, trans, and ed. by A. M. Harmon (Leob Classical Library). 8 vols.  
(London: William Heinemann, 1921), IV, 107-109.
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the worst offenders, not only telling wilder tales than the rest, but
 
even vouching for the authenticity of the monstrous lies promul
­gated by their fellow scholars.
Certainly it is difficult to overvalue More’s admiration for the
 
chief classical practitioner of Menippean satire. For despite Lucian’s
 inevitable pagan lapses, there are no apologies for the Greek satirist
 in the dedicatory epistle which More affixed to his translations and
 no equivocations in his praise:
If,
 most learned sir, there was ever anyone who fulfilled the Horatian  
precept and combined delight with instruction I think Lucian certainly
 stood primus inter pares in this respect. Refraining both from the arrogant
 teachings of the philosophers and the more dissolute dallyings of the poets,
 he everywhere remarks and censures, with very honest and at the same time
 very amusing wit, the shortcomings of mortals. And this he does so cleverly
 and so effectively that although no one pricks more deeply, yet there is no
 one of impartial mind 
who
 would not allow his stings of sarcasm.7
This is indeed heady praise, for in the sixteenth century the Ho
­
ratian dictum was nearly the sole criteria for judging the worth of
 imaginative literature. On the basis of such testimony, taken in con
­junction with More’s peculiar native talents, his admiration for Lu
­cian’s philosophic position and his choice of satiric targets, it would
 be remarkable indeed if More composed a humorous prose work
 which did not bear the imprint of his close study and admiration of
 the Greek satirist.
In turning from a
 
discussion  of Lucian’s attacks on narrow-minded  
philosophers to More’s Utopia, our initial subject for examination
 will be its curious mariner-philosopher, Raphael Hythloday. In the
 Dialogue of Counsel in Book I, Hythloday and the fictional More
 figure find themselves dialectical opponents, and their conversation
 lays the foundation for Hythloday’s development as a classical satiric
 persona. The fictional More argues that Hythloday, a public-spirited
 man of such
 
great parts, should “do what  is worthy of you and of this  
generous and truly philosophic spirit of yours if you so order your
 life as to apply your talent and industry to the public interest, even
 if it involves some personal disadvantages to yourself.”8 Hythloday’s
 reply reveals the oversimplification of men and institutions that
 marks his whole philosophy and outlook. Hythloday will not go to
7
 
C. R. Thompson, The Translations of Lucian, pp. 24-25.
8
 
Utopia, p. 57.
5
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court, first, because “almost all monarchs” occupy themselves in ig
­
noble pursuits, self-aggrandizement, and insidious plotting.9 In the
 second place, no one would heed him because at court “everyone is
 actually so wise as to have no need of profiting by another’s counsel,
 or everyone seems so wise in his own eyes as not to condescend to
 profit by it.”10
On the face of it, these pronouncements possess a measure of truth,
 
and More doubtless would agree with them. But ultimately, one sus
­pects, they reflect the simple-mindedness and kindred alazoneia of
 their spokesman. To Hythloday’s mind, there are no complexities in
 the world; things are right or wrong, good or bad, black or white. He
 recognizes no shadings, no authentic humanity. It 
is
 on the basis of  
this world view, prompting him to systematize and categorize every
­thing, that Hythloday condemns all things European and commends
 all things Utopian.
Also like the foolish philosophers of Lucian’s dialogue, Hythlo
­
day’s method of argument reveals his penchant for abstract theory
 and generalization. Hythloday never argues a point on the practical
 level. For example, as the chief point of his argument for the aboli
­tion
 
of capital punishment in Europe, he points not to an example of  
a real state which functions successfully without capital punishment
 but to the example of the Polyerites, a people whom he had encoun
­tered on his travels and whose name, as the humanist fraternity would
 have recognized, means the “People of Much Nonsense.” When
 pressed for logical proofs and concrete examples, Hythloday points
 consistently to the unreal, to the People of Much Nonsense to prove
 that capital punishment may be successfully abolished in the state;
 to the Achorians, the People without Place, to prove that bellicose
 imperialism is a self-defeating policy for a monarch; and, most perti
­nently, to the Utopians, the inhabitants of Nowhere, to prove that
 communism is the only economic basis for a good commonwealth
 and Epicurean hedonism its wisest official philosophy.
The identification of Hythloday with the philosophus gloriosus is
 
reinforced throughout Book I. Having delivered himself on the cor
­ruption of those in high place and the uselessness of attempting to
 advise monarchs, Hythloday moves into a reminiscence of his trip
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
6
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to England which completely contradicts the condemnation he has
 
just uttered. While on his visit, Hythloday stayed at the home of
 Cardinal Morton, Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chancellor
 of England, whom Hythloday praises for his sagacity, virtue, and
 similar fine qualities. Oblivious to the fact that he is contradicting
 his earlier speech, Hythloday recalls that “the king placed the great
­est confidence in his advice, and the commonwealth seemed much to
 depend upon him when I was there.”11 At the same time he con
­demns, in a manner analogous to that of his earlier speech, the bad
 counsel of the Cardinal’s retainers, lawyers, clerics, and the like. Still,
 Cardinal Morton displays no inclination to take any of this bad ad
­vice, nor does Hythloday intimate that he ever did. He does, on the
 other hand, question Hythloday intelligently and courteously and he
 shows every sign of having benefited from Hythloday’s views. In fact,
 the Cardinal endorses Hythloday’s opposition to capital punishment
 and says that its temporary abolition would be a worthwhile experi
­ment in the state.
11 Ibid., pp.59,61.
12 And immediately preceeding his demonstration of the specious quality of his
 
satiric persona’s logic, More has added a fine ironic twist, after the manner of
 Lucian, by making Hythloday denounce in others the “proud, ridiculous and ob
­stinate prejudices” of which he himself is so often a prime example. (Ibid., p. 59)
This encounter with Cardinal Morton affords a typical example
 
of More’s satiric
 
method in conditioning his reader’s reactions to the  
satiric persona Hythloday and consequently, by extension, to the
 Utopian world which Hythloday describes and endorses in Book II.
 The method 
seems
 not to have been noticed by critics of the Utopia  
and therefore warrants a brief analysis. It is, in its simplest form, a
 device of juxtapositions, between the theoretical, unreal, abstract,
 and erroneous on the one hand, and the practical, real, concrete, and
 reliable on the other. In the incident just referred to, Hythloday’s
 earlier generalizations about the character of rulers and the ineffec
­tuality of good advisors are directly contradicted through the con
­crete example, delivered by Hythloday himself, of a good and noble
 advisor who, again by Hythloday’s own admission, is highly effica
­cious in directing his monarch to rule the state in the most virtuous
 manner. This advisor, though of high rank and himself the head of
 a household of retainers, is willing to listen to and learn from a
 stranger who would advise him.12
7
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This juxtaposition of theory and practice, general and particular,
 
unreal and real, abstract and concrete, is operative throughout Book
 1, and constitutes the major satiric technique by which More under
­cuts the credibility of his satiric persona and dissociates himself from
 Hythloday’s judgments on Utopian institutions and practices.
This self-contradiction also takes the form of the denial
 
or  ignoring  
of a fact which is obvious to all but the speaker, as in Hythloday’s
 assertion at the conclusion of Book I that he admires Utopian justice
 because “with very 
few
 laws, affairs are ordered so aptly that virtue  
has its reward... 
.
”13 This in face of the fact that if there ever were  
a law-ridden state, it is Utopia, and that it is precisely this plethora
 of laws which fascinates Hythloday in his account of the island.14
13 Ibid., p. 103.
14 W. J. Barnes, who has also noted this particular contradiction, writes of Hyth
­
loday that “what he admires in Utopia is the fact that whenever and wherever
 Utopian human nature has shown any tendency toward irrational or subrational
 conduct, the Utopians have passed a law against it. This multiplicity of rational
 laws—some silly souls, less enlightened than Hythloday of 
course,
 have thought  
many of them absurd—these many laws are mentioned in almost every paragraph
 of Raphael’s narration, though he tells us at one point that one of the great vir
­tues of Utopia is there are but a few laws!” (
“
Irony and the English Apprehension  
of Renewal,” Queen's Quarterly, 73 [1966], p. 368)
15 It is interesting to note that this is a decidedly non-Christian position, deny
­
ing original sin and implying the perfectability of man. This is a consideration
 which would hardly have escaped those humanists who, with tongue in cheek,
 
This method of
 
discrediting the judgment of the satiric persona by  
setting real and
 
practical against unreal and theoretical and allowing  
the persona to incriminate himself is a distinctly Menippean tech
­nique, for a prime example of which one need look no further than
 the Lucianic dialogue “The Lover of Lies,” which More had trans
­lated earlier in his career.
The similarities between Hythloday and the Menippean philoso
­
phies gloriosus are apparent not only
 
in Hythloday’s abstract method  
of argumentation, but also in his world view touched upon earlier.
 Hythloday’s rigorous intellectualism blinds him to the
 
idiosyncracies,  
to the essential
 
humaness, of humanity. His real interest is in systems  
not people. And he has the universal panacea, the simple solution to
 all of the troubles of mankind: communism.
According to Hythloday, the abolishment of private property will
 
rapidly and inevitably bring about the eradication of injustice, in
­equality, poverty, and all the other ills of European society.15 A
 
8
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relatively simple change in the social system will cure all of man’s
 
problems. Hythloday’s equation remains simple: communism works
 in the land of Nowhere, therefore it will work in Europe or anywhere.
 The fallacy of the equation is pointed out by the fictional More. In
 rebuttal to Hythloday’s arguments, More attacks “this academic phi
­losophy which thinks that everything is suitable to every place,”16
 and offers
 
a pragmatic philosophy which embodies the attainable and  
the workable. More’s argument for the practical rather than the theo
­retical takes the following form.
echo Hythloday’s blanket endorsement of Utopian institutions in the prefatory
 
letters.
16 Utopia, p. 99.
17 Ibid.
But there is another philosophy, more practical for statesmen, which
 
knows 
its
 stage, adapts itself to the play in hand, and performs its role  
neatly and appropriately. This is the philosophy which you must employ.
 Otherwise we have the situation in which 
a
 comedy of Plautus is being per ­
formed and the household slaves are making trivial jokes at one another and
 then you come on the stage in a philosopher’s attire and recite the passage
 from Octavia where Seneca is disputing with Nero. Would it not have been
 preferable to take a part without words than by reciting something inappro
­priate to make a hodgepodge of comedy and tragedy? You would have spoiled
 and upset the actual play 
by
 bringing in the irrelevant matter— even if your  
contribution would have been superior in 
itself.
 Whatever play is being per ­
formed, perform it as best you can, and do not upset it all simply because
 you think of another which has more interest.
So it is in the commonwealth. So it is in the deliberations of the monarchs.
 
If you cannot pluck up the wrongheaded opinions by the root, if you cannot
 cure according to your heart’s desire vices long standing, yet you must not
 on that account desert the commonwealth. You must not abandon the ship
 in a storm because you cannot control the winds.17
The basis for this condemnation 
is
 a clear and steady view of the  
world as it is, not
 
simply as one would like it to be. It is a plea for the  
acceptance of reality and the adoption of a practical workable phi
­losophy, and as such it shares common ground with the Menippean
 satirist. It is a straightforward condemnation of a closed philosophy
 which pretends to reduce the mutable world to a well-oiled, predict
­able and regulated, machine. More’s reply may lack the vitriol of
 Lucian but the message is the same, and it is a distinctly Menippean
 
9
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message.18 And the motive
 is
 also that of the Menippean satirist: one  
does not abandon the ship because he cannot control the winds. In
­stead of turning his back on the real and searching for perfection,
 one writes, as Lucian had and as More on the title page of the Utopia
 proclaimed that he had, a work “No less Beneficial than Entertain
­ing,” to correct what faults one may, in the realization that some
 faults are too deeply embedded in the fabric of humanity ever to be
 totally eradicated. One writes in order that, as the fictional More
 puts it, “What you cannot turn to good you must make as little bad
 as you can.”19 Hythloday 
is
 so deeply imbued with the “academic  
philosophy” that he
 
can tolerate, even if he is aware of, no other, and  
he
 
rejects the fictional More’s suggestion out of hand.20
More also manipulates his satiric persona in a manner character
­istic of Menippean satire. Hythloday 
is
 used as both a target and a  
tool of More’s satiric attack. As philosophus gloriosus, Hythloday’s
 function is that of an alazon21 In this role More employs him to ex
­pose the folly of the argumentative technique and philosophic posi
­tion
 
he embodies. His view of the evil in the world as springing from  
a social root rather than a fundamentally humane one is discredited
 both by his own words and by the speeches of the fictional More. In
 typically Menippean fashion, however, More builds upon the good
 intention
 
and moral character  of his satiric persona so as to secure the  
advantages of eiron as well as alazon. However much Hythloday’s
 philosophical position is undercut, his personal good intentions and
 high moral purpose are never impugned. It 
is
 as a good, public-  
spirited, if misguided, man that Hythloday is employed by the author
 
as
 an  eiron to attack existing vice and corruption in sixteenth-century  
Europe. Thus, in the dual use of his satiric persona, More is able to
 have it both ways, to both agree and disagree, to laugh at and com
­mend his persona’s various attacks on European society and praise of
 Utopian institutions. The technique is a favorite among Menippean
 satirists, perhaps the most
 
famous non-classical example being Swift’s
18
 
See Juanita S. Williams, “Towards a Definition of Menippean Satire,” (un ­
published Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1966), p. 5.
19
 
Utopia, p. 101.
20
 
Ibid.
21
 
The terms alazon and eiron, respectively the foolish intellectual imposter and  
the shrewd under-player, are borrowed from classical comedy. See David Wor-
 chester’s The Art of Satire (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969) and Frye’s Anatomy of
 Criticism for discussions of the two as natural adversaries in classical satire.
10
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Gulliver.22 This dual function of Hythloday is the most thoroughly
 
Menippean characteristic
 
of More’s use of the satiric persona.
22 Some, but by no means all, 
of
 the similarities between More’s technique and  
that of Swift in Gulliver's Travels have been explored by John Traugott in “
A Voyage to Nowhere with Thomas More and Jonathan 
Swift,
” Sewanee Review, 69  
(1961), 534-65. Apparently the similarities between More and Rabelais have not
 been explored, an odd circumstance 
since
 More is obviously one of Rabelais* mas ­
ters. It is worth remembering that Pantagruel is one-half Utopian, his mother
 being queen of Amaurotum, the capital city of Utopia. And he is hailed as the
 savior of Utopia when he, along with Panurge and their companions, repel the in
­vasion of the Dipsodes and rescue that nation.
23 Juanita S. Williams, “Towards a Definition of Menippean Satire,” p. 48.
24 Utopia, p. 101.
This combination of alazoneia and eironeia in a single figure has
 
perplexed critics. As eiron in Book I, the facet of his character tradi
­tionally emphasized by
 
critics, Hythloday  continually pierces through  
the sham, hypocrisy, and cant of sixteenth-century Europe. It
 
is Hyth ­
loday who makes the famous accusation that enclosure has become
 so wide-spread in England that men no longer live off the sheep;
 rather the sheep now devour Englishmen. It is he who inveighs
 against the idle and wasteful nobility and their retainers, against a
 standing professional army in peace-time and against the unscrupu
­lous policies of European monarchs. And there is must truth in the
 eiroris charges. The evils and abuses did indeed exist; but the reme
­dies proposed are often more radical and destructive than the evils
 intended
 
to  cure. Here the eiron becomes alazon.
The alazon is not interested in reforming the abuses in a human,
 and hence imperfect, system. His solution is to abolish it and erect
 in its place a perfect system, Utopianism. This is the perfect pattern
 which the philosophus gloriosus will impose upon a mutable world
 of fallible human beings; and of course it will not work. One of the
 fundamental lessons of Menippean satire 
is
 that the philosophus gio-  
riosus' schemes never do or can bring perfection, perfect order, from
 the changeable world of man, ruled by fortune.23 The reality which
 is overlooked in Hythloday’s systematizing will not be denied. The
 fictional More points directly to the chief obstacle to all of Hythlo
­day’s proposals: humanity itself. The problem is, as More says, that
 “it is impossible that all should be well unless all men were good, a
 situation which I do not expect for a great many years to come!”24
As alazon, Hythloday is sure that he has discovered the cure-all in
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Utopianism. He 
is
 so sure that he will have no part of what he regards  
as the half-measures of the fictional More’s practical philosophy, to
 make as little bad as possible what you cannot turn to good. For the
 philosophus gloriosus, everything can be turned to good if only his
 system is adopted. Here two prominent attributes of Hythloday’s
 alazoneia are apparent: his overreaching and his intellectual pride.
 His reply to the fictional More’s advice of a practical philosophy is a
 curt one:
By this approach,... I should accomplish nothing else than to share the
 
madness of others as I tried to cure their lunacy. If I would stick to the truth,
 I must needs speak in the manner I have 
described.
 To speak falsehoods, for  
all I know, may be the part of 
a
 philosopher, but it is certainly not for me.25
Thus the final irony of the philosophus gloriosus. He will not ac
­
commodate himself to things as they are, even far enough to attempt
 to persuade a monarch to institute some or all of the Utopian prac
­
tice
s. He will not go to court. He  will not act. He only talks, preaches.  
Hythloday’s world
 
is words, not things, or human beings: he can only  
juggle abstractions and he respects only statistics.
Opposed to the needless complexities and impossible system
­
mongering of the philosophus gloriosus there exists in the text itself
 only the philosophical position which holds that the simple, practi
­cal, and common-sensical are man’s best and truest guides to a mu
­table world he never made and never could hope to completely and
 effectively control.
This normative attitude is most explicit in Book I. It is there ex
­
pressed directly as an ideal by the fictional More and illustrated in
 practice by the example of Cardinal Morton.26 The norm 
is
 much
25 Ibid. The Lucianic irony of Hythloday’s last sentence is obvious. The use of
 
the madness in this passage is also Menippean. It is the madman, the philosophus
 gloriosus, who believes that only he is sane and that it is the rest of the world
 which has gone mad.
26 Harry Berger, Jr. has noted Cardinal Morton’s normative function but he
 
tends to 
view
 Morton as the norm in the Utopia rather than as only one source of  
it. According to Berger, “More has placed the contrast to all these Utopian meth
­ods, and the criteria by which they are to be judged, in the figure of Cardinal
 Morton.” (“The Renaissance Imagination: Second World and Green World,”
 Centennial Review, 9 [1956], 70) His position is adopted and further argued by
 Robbin S. Johnson, More's Utopia: Ideal and Illusion (New Haven: Yale Univer
­sity Press, 1969), pp. 59-60. The difficulty here 
is
 that Morton is simply not promi ­
nent enough in the narrative to function as a norm for the work as a whole. In
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stronger or more insistent and obvious in Book I than in Book II,
 
where it is largely implict and residual. As a sane and steady counter
­poise both in theory and practice to the sophistical fantasies of Hyth-
 loday, it functions as the reader’s guide to the torrent of ideas, propo
­sitions, and arguments which flow from Hythloday.
This consideration leads to another of some importance, the man
­
ner in which characterization is handled in the Utopia. The work
 opens with realistic descriptions of the characters; and, although all
 the characters exist in a work of fiction and are themselves fictional,
 several of them,
 
Thomas More, Peter Giles, and later in  the narrative,  
Cardinal Morton, bear the names, traits, and known characteristics
 of real people. These characters are nevertheless, in this context, fic
­tional, and as in such satiric dialogues as Lucian’s Philosophies for
 Sale, their resemblance to their living prototypes 
is
 distorted by the  
author to serve satiric purposes. In the early portion of Book I, the
 fictional More appears to have a touch of the ingenue about him;
 Giles, who appears only sporadically in Book I and not at all in
 Book II, is more credulous than More; and Cardinal Morton 
is
 ag ­
grandized into a personification of virtue, wisdom, and piety. The
 realistic aspect of the characterization 
is
 clearly subordinate to the  
author’s interest in the mental and philosophical attitudes of his
 fictional characters which controls the characterization. To achieve
 the desired satiric ends, More is quite willing to abandon the pretense
 of verisimilitude which the names of More, Giles, and Morton help
 to maintain, even to the point of making his good friend and fellow
 humanist Peter Giles into a rather foolish fellow who is completely
 taken in by Hythloday’s marvelous tale. This credulity of the char
­acter Giles enables More to manipulate him as a “straight man” for
 Hythloday. It is Giles who keeps the discourse moving and who in
­troduces new topics at opportune moments when Hythloday has ex
­hausted a subject or when the reasoning of the fictional More comes
 too close to exposing Hythloday’s fallacious reasoning before he has
fact, the character of Cardinal Morton is almost exactly analogous to Swift’s Don
 
Pedro de Mendoza in Book IV of Gulliver's Travels. Mendoza is a striking example
 of the satirist’s intellectual norm in action, and he enters at a crucial moment to
 contradict by his presence the fulminations of the philosophus gloriosus; but he
 is not in and of himself the whole show, nor need he be. The norm in the Utopia
 is explicitly stated once, implied everywhere, and incarnated, at different times, in
 both Cardinal Morton and the fictional More, most noticeably in the latter at the
 conclusion of Book II.
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told his tale. Although the fictional More is more than a bit gullible,
 
never questioning the reality of Hythloday’s voyage, this facet of his
 characterization 
does
 not interfere with the tentative identification  
of the philosophical position and mental attitude of the fictional
 More with that of the author More. The same satiric expediency
 that calls for a characterization of the fictional More as naive in re
­gard to Hythloday’s voyage demands at the same time that there be
 nothing naive about the fictional More’s attitude toward Hythloday’s
 ideas and his method of defending them. Indeed, the naif aspect of
 the fictional More’s characterization may be an extension of the char
­acter’s eironeia. For it is by holding back behind the naif facade that
 the More character disingenuously encourages the alazon Hythloday
 to overextend himself. At any rate, this 
is
 certainly the practical re ­
sult of the fictional More’s credulity.
The basic conflict in the Utopia, then, is between different sets of
 
mental attitudes. The characters function as mouthpieces for these
 attitudes, and the characterization is styled to fulfill satiric purposes.
Just as the characterization and the central narrative emphasis are
 
thoroughly Menippean, so too is the structure of the Utopia. Struc
­turally, the work falls into two distinct parts. The basic structural
 principle of Book I is the dialogue, revolving about the introduction
 of the fictional More to the traveler-philosopher Hythloday and their
 debate over
 
whether Hythloday could best serve the state by going to  
court as an advisor. This dialectical structure, according to Northrup
 Frye, is the most common form of the short Menippean satire.27
 Within the narrative framework of the book the characters, who func
­tion as
 
mouthpieces for different sets of mental attitudes, are brought  
together for an exchange
 
of views through the use of a related Menip ­
pean device which Frye calls cena.28 The characters first come to
­gether by accident in
 
a street  and determine to adjourn to the  fictional  
More’s garden, to hear Hythloday’s description of his travels. The fic
­tional
 
setting for the entire narrative of  Books I and  II is the fictional  
More’s garden, which functions as a symposium setting for the ideo
­logical conflict between the fictional More and Hythloday. Hythlo
­day’s long digressive reminiscence of his trip to England also employs
27 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, p. 310. Most critics do not consider this
 
possibility, preferring with the editors of the Yale Utopia to reflexively derive the
 dialogue form of Book I from Plato.
28 Ibid.
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the cena convention. The setting for Hythloday’s digression is Cardi
­
nal Morton’s dinner table, a setting which draws a number of new
 characters into the narrative and provides Hythloday with a philo
­sophical adversarius in Cardinal Morton, an object of attack in the
 stock character of the pedantic lawyer, and opportunity for inci
­dental satire on corrupt and lazy members of the religious order.
Finally, the interest in ideas rather than realistic characters pro
­
duces something like the logical dislocation remarked of Menippean
 strategy by Frye. In Book I, Hythloday’s sophistical habit of switch
­ing back and forth between the real and the imaginary in the course
 of his discussion is more than sufficient to throw the careless reader
 into a complete state of confusion as to what is real and what is not.
 A typical example of this dislocation occurs when Hythloday moves
 heedlessly from a discussion of conditions in the French court to con
­ditions among an imaginary people called Achorians and then back
 to the French court again. This same 
effect
 of logical dislocation is 
also achieved in the digressions of Book I, as when, for example, the
 central focus of the reader’s interest, the dialogue between Cardinal
 Morton and Hythloday, is interrupted for several pages in order to
 interject a humorous and satirical conversation between a jester and
 a friar, two
 
peripheral and inconsequential characters.
Finally, such a reading as that proposed here possesses the advan
­tage of recognizing the true literary merit of More’s little “golden
 book.” For when considered as Menippean satire, the Utopia justi
­fiably may be regarded as a great artistic success similar to the Enco
­mium Moriae. Any interpretation of the Utopia which views the work
 as a predominately serious treatise may call it many things but not an
 artistic success. As a philosophical treatise it must be accounted
a failure, for the unified program and the consistent philosophical po
­sition which the myriad ideas in the Utopia supposedly mirror have
 yet to be elucidated and systematized after over four hundred and
 fifty years of intensive study. Only under the rubric of Menippean
 satire can the Utopia legitimately assume the lofty position in the
 canon of English literature to which its author’s artistry and centu
­ries of universal acclaim entitle it.
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